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Catharine MacKinnon’s feminist work on sexual abuse and violence has had a 
major impact on law and on policy in the United States and internationally. 
However, her complex theoretical writings, which are a foundation of that work, 
have yet to be adequately appreciated by philosophy, especially continental 
philosophy, that tradition with which she identifies her project. I explain her project 
in continental terms, especially Heidegger’s thought, so that we may better grasp 
the philosophical nature and significance of her work. In doing so, I also open paths 
by which those within the continental tradition may make it more relevant to the 
pressing real-world problems that MacKinnon uniquely illuminates, especially 
pornography, prostitution, and other practices significantly constituted by sexual 
abuse and violence. 
 
 






It’s a pleasure and an honor to comment on and celebrate Catharine 
MacKinnon’s Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (TFTS).1 I first read this book 
shortly after it was published twenty-five years ago and have returned to it on 
numerous occasions, with every reading revealing another layer of depth and 
                                                        
1 I presented a version of this paper at the Pacific Division meeting of the American 
Philosophical Association (April 1–4, 2015), on a panel marking the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of the publication of Catharine MacKinnon’s Toward a Feminist Theory 
of the State (1989). Thank you to Lori Watson for the invitation and opportunity to 
present these reflections. Also, thank you to the organizers of the annual meeting of 
the Pacific Association for the Continental Tradition, where I presented a shorter 
version of the paper (September 24–26, 2015). 
1
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relevance. That feature of course reflects the power of major works, but it is also 
part of their vulnerability. For it takes a long time for writings that so profoundly 
move the ground under our taken-for-granted understandings to be more widely 
grasped. This contrasts with many works that attain immediate recognition, only 
soon to be forgotten as a trend, as outdated, or not as profound as many initially 
thought.  
Hegel remarks on this phenomenon. He notes that some works “after a time 
[have] no audience left” while others have “an audience only after a time” (Hegel 
1977, 45). Referring specifically to MacKinnon, Guido Calabresi, former dean of Yale 
Law School and senior judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 
indicated something of this sort. “[Her work] was so original that law faculties did 
not understand its significance . . . and MacKinnon ‘didn’t have the patience to write 
the kind of busywork that we would have understood’” (Strebeigh 1991).  
I think (and hope) that TFTS and, more generally, MacKinnon’s deeply 
grounded theoretical oeuvre is that kind of work, which will have its eventual 
audience. It especially needs an audience that appreciates the philosophical project 
behind the significant real-world impact that her writings and social interventions 
have already had. For instance, her concept of sexual harassment was adopted by 
the courts, her rethinking of rape has contributed to rape law reform, and (with 
Andrea Dworkin) a reconceptualization of pornography yielded the unprecedented 
feminist civil rights approaches to pornography in the 1980s and early 1990s 
(MacKinnon 1989, xiv). There remains tremendous need for MacKinnon’s work given 
the ubiquity of pornography today, growing sex trafficking, and other sexual abuses 
whose physical and psychological damage and aftereffects often invisibly 
reverberate throughout late modern life. These are problems that MacKinnon has 
spent her career confronting through complex analysis and groundbreaking practical 
means.  
Professional philosophy has begun seriously taking up TFTS, which I treat 
here as part of her wider work. Analytic philosophy has led these efforts. Early on, 
Sally Haslanger, Rae Langton, Martha Nussbaum, Susan Brison, Lori Watson, and 
others recognized its significance. They have rigorously and more comprehensively 
engaged it in ways that intersect, for instance, with the philosophy of language, 
epistemology, moral philosophy, political philosophy, philosophy of law, and early 
modern history of philosophy. Often, these engagements have made creative use of 
philosophical concepts to frame MacKinnon’s breakthroughs in new ways, for 
example, through Austin’s speech-act theory or through Kantian moral philosophy.2 
Other treatments have explicated and elaborated MacKinnon’s insights, such as her 
analysis of the relationship between objectivity and sexual objectification. They have 
                                                        
2 See Langton 2009; Maitra and McGowen 2012. 
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helped explain her claim that the objective stance has often concealed sexual 
objectification when that stance has merely mirrored, as truth, the outcome of what 
men’s political and social power over women has so successfully manufactured.3 
These engagements with MacKinnon’s thought have variously unpacked her 
breakthroughs, which has contributed to rendering them more widely intelligible.  
Continental philosophy, by contrast, has generally been less receptive to 
MacKinnon’s thought. Here, it hasn’t been treated as much and as thoroughly. 
When it is treated, it is not unusual to find it simplified or mischaracterized. This 
kind of reception makes it easier to dismiss her work and to evade the philosophical 
challenges it poses. It especially facilitates evading the ethical summons to confront 
the very trying and pervasive problems of sexual violence, abuse, and objectification 
in their variety of forms. In continental feminism, MacKinnon’s thought doesn’t have 
that more immediately identifiable place that it has in analytic feminism, a place 
that might support and make it more realistically possible to engage her thought in 
continental terms.  
One is certainly an odd person out and often falling through the professional 
cracks when one tries to treat her work within the orbit of continental classics such 
as works by Hegel, Heidegger, or Arendt. For MacKinnon’s thought doesn’t yet have 
a presence within these traditional areas. Meanwhile, trying to create such a 
presence there is also to go against the grain of what is usually done as continental 
feminism, such as explicating or using the thought of Beauvoir, Kristeva, Irigaray, 
Judith Butler, or psychoanalysis. As I will spell out below, MacKinnon’s project is 
unambiguously continental. Undoubtedly, she is also one of the most significant 
feminist thinkers. Yet it is as if her thought isn’t “continental feminism,” at least not 
in the way that it is mainly understood and conducted in academic philosophy 
today.  
In what follows, I address this somewhat perplexing current state of 
MacKinnon’s thought within continental philosophy. There are many ways to 
approach this topic. For my present purposes, my focus is not to lay out what I 
consider the numerous simplifications and mischaracterizations of her work and 
then demonstrate how she actually does not say this or that, or how her positions 
are in fact much more subtle, or how criticisms of positions wrongly ascribed to her 
are in fact her own criticisms, or how she already anticipated and addressed a given 
criticism. There is of course much benefit to this approach.  
My aim instead is to show how classically continental MacKinnon’s work is, 
especially by pointing out some of its connections to Heidegger’s philosophy even 
                                                        
3 See Haslanger 1993. 
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though she makes no references to his work.4 In so doing, I indicate a few of the 
innumerable ways that continental philosophy might productively engage her 
thought. I want thereby to help create a bridge that might make it more possible for 
those in continental philosophy, especially graduate students and researchers, to 
directly encounter her work instead of attaining “familiarity” with it in a manner 
filtered by a caricature of it. Facilitating more considered treatment of her thought 
in what seems its obvious philosophical home will ultimately make philosophy more 
accountable and relevant to the urgent and difficult contemporary problems that 
she uniquely illuminates. Pornography, trafficking in sexual slavery, and other sexual 
abuse and violence that abound in late modern life pose incredible challenges to 
thinking and desperately need the resources and intervention of philosophy. 
 
Continental Philosophy, MacKinnon’s Continental Project, and Heidegger’s 
Thought 
Continental philosophy is that tradition of mainly European thought from 
around the time of Hegel onward that seeks to understand the humanistic domain 
in a manner that is more self-consciously experiential and world-involved. It is 
grounded in life problems as they are lived in the world. Those working within this 
tradition also understand their contributions as situated within the history of 
philosophy. The few among them who are also major thinkers advance their own 
original theories, but those theories are something like later parts of that common 
and familiar philosophical story or historical reference point. Of course, not 
everyone working in continental philosophy today is doing such grounded work that 
is so directly relevant to real-world concerns; indeed, few are. That few philosophers 
of every era make breakthroughs of this kind is a separate topic beyond my current 
scope. My purpose here is only to state salient features of this tradition’s self-
concept in some of the ways that it shifts from the more detached major 
philosophies of the early modern period epitomized by figures such as Descartes 
and Kant.  
Most basically, MacKinnon’s project is continental because it is self-identified 
as such. It reflects her doctoral training in the history of modern German philosophy 
and the history of political philosophy. She studied these areas through both the 
political science and philosophy departments at Yale in the 1970s with prominent 
continental thinkers such as Shlomo Avineri and Karsten Harries.  
MacKinnon’s work is also phenomenological through and through (1989, 38–
39), which I understand in a generally Heideggerian sense as theoretical in a manner 
                                                        
4 In MacKinnon’s remarks during the panel presentation of this paper, she very 
emphatically and publicly agreed with how it philosophically situates her work. She 
stated: “FINALLY someone got it.”  
4




guided by, emanating from, and always anchored in lived experience. 
Phenomenology is her way of fundamentally questioning, testing, and rethinking 
governing assumptions about the areas of life she investigates and of putting forth 
new interpretations that better account for that experience. In addition to being an 
original thinker, MacKinnon is also an innovative and groundbreaking lawyer, which 
underscores her phenomenological approach. For in this profession, one is often 
forced to face the everyday, nitty-gritty reality and details of harms as they are lived 
in the world. This is how she arrived at deeper theoretical understanding of various 
forms of sexual abuse. That new understanding in turn guided her proposals for 
making law more accountable to those harms, which she has accomplished in 
historic ways.  
Accordingly, MacKinnon’s theoretical work emanates from the “minutiae of 
everyday existence” (1989, 38) or, as she says about her specific inquiry into 
pornography, “how [it] works in everyday life” (MacKinnon 1997, 23). Her complex 
thought doesn’t drift into flights of theoretical fancy that are disconnected from life, 
as often occurs in philosophy and other theoretical endeavors. The latter is no less 
an issue with many contemporary continental theorists despite this tradition’s self-
understanding to the contrary. Indeed, MacKinnon’s theoretical and legal work 
might be considered a model for how to make phenomenology within philosophy, in 
particular Heideggerian phenomenology, truer to itself. On her understanding, 
original thinking and innovative law are born precisely in this way. They come from 
the “ground up,” from out of that crucible of the interaction respectively of thought 
and law with life (1989, xiv). As she states this point elsewhere, “Legal change comes 
from life, not from the brow of moral readers [detached from the world]” 
(MacKinnon 2007b, 68). This notion of thinking could have come straight out of 
Heidegger’s philosophy.  
A main project of TFTS is to offer an original theory of women’s social 
subordination that emanates phenomenologically from most women’s experiences 
of various forms of sexual objectification and violation. Those experiences reflect a 
dimension of the human condition that is usually hidden and that her analysis—to 
state the matter in Heideggerian language—aims to “draw out of concealment” 
(Wrathall 2011). A major component of her theory formation is a constructively 
critical encounter with the dominant contemporary and historical account of 
oppression, namely Marxist thought.  
This path of theory formation exemplifies Heidegger’s idea of philosophy’s 
vocation. Philosophy as such delineates usually hidden dimensions of the human 
condition through grappling with how they are actually experienced in the world 
5
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and through the aid of a constructively critical encounter with philosophy’s past.5 
That ground of experience and the new understanding emanating from it guide the 
thinker in dismantling, at their source, problematic assumptions in philosophy’s 
history that persist into the present-day and contribute to the cover-up of these 
usually concealed dimensions of the human condition. That ground also orients the 
thinker toward discovering resources in philosophy’s history that she may creatively 
adapt to this task of illuminating these dimensions. This way of responding 
philosophically to a contemporary problem that philosophy or theory hasn’t 
addressed or is only beginning to address remains anchored within an identifiable 
historical tradition.  
Heidegger scholar William Lovitt summarizes this idea of philosophy. It is 
“thinking within the sphere of tradition” (1977, xxxvii) but that, here, elicits the 
“unthought” from the thought (xxxviii). “As such it is freed by tradition from being a 
mere thinking back, to becoming a thinking forward . . .” (xxxvii), Lovitt continues, 
stating that philosophy so understood reshapes the past “in the next on-writing of 
thought” and thus “point[s] to some way or reality needed beyond what is now 
known” (xxxviii, italics added). Simon Critchley clarifies philosophy as such. It 
responds to a contemporary crisis “through a critique of present conditions” 
(Critchley 2001, 72–73) and a relationship to philosophy’s past that is not merely 
that of received experience but “a critical confrontation with the history of 
philosophy and history as such” (68–69, italics in the original). This “appeal to 
tradition . . . is in no way traditional” but grapples with “what has been unthought 
within [philosophy’s past] and what remains to be thought by it” (69). 
Here, a phenomenological approach goes so far as to yield insights that are 
of the order of groundbreaking thought or philosophy. Phenomenology gathers 
insights that emanate from lived experience, but as an approach, it is fairly broad. It 
covers a wide range of such insights, including those gleaned in this way in areas 
outside philosophy. In exceptional cases, however, the phenomenologist gathers 
and hones them in a manner that yields an original and notably deep account of the 
worldly area in question. This is original thinking or philosophy in Heidegger’s sense. 
It is, of course, phenomenological but a distinct and deeper expression of it.  
The main and guiding source of MacKinnon’s original theory is women’s 
experiences of sexual objectification and violation. They were first more widely 
revealed through consciousness-raising groups, which were a key element of the 
                                                        
5 See Heidegger 2003; Campbell 2012. My review of Campbell’s book (Nenadic 2014) 
draws attention to aspects of it that pertain to Heidegger’s idea of philosophy’s 
vocation. It also describes some of the specific ways that Heidegger engages 
philosophy’s past, especially in relation to figures such as Plato and Aristotle, as part 
of the formation of his own original contemporary thought. 
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feminist movement in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, and through the 
social studies to which they gave rise and that more systematically tracked these 
phenomena. We may think of these groups as constituting something like a clearing 
within a larger social context that so effectively denied the reality of these 
experiences and so successfully pilloried those who would assert that reality. As 
MacKinnon notes, citing Pamela Allen, “[consciousness raising] ‘clears a space in the 
world’ within which women can begin to move” (1989, 101). These groups were 
trusted, open, and free spaces for eliciting, making, and safeguarding such 
disclosures. In an often pre-articulate and groping way, here women gave voice to, 
named, and ultimately revealed a pervasive, though usually hidden, pattern of 
sexually intrusive treatment of women and the varieties of psychological, physical, 
and other damage that that treatment causes (1989, 83–95). This pattern was so 
widespread that it was simply thought to be natural, the “way things are” and thus 
in no need of questioning.  
This manner of articulating something that so profoundly affects and limits 
one’s life may be considered an example of what Heidegger considers 
phenomenology’s most basic way of recovering usually concealed dimensions of the 
human condition, that is, of according them the status of being considered real. This 
recovery occurs through listening to and speaking with others to give language to 
that experience. Such authentic speaking, as Heidegger calls it, erupts in those 
moments in which one has been delivered to a heightened awareness and anxiety 
about one’s existence. Here, one has made a decision to try to come to terms with 
one’s life and with who one is.6 
Consciousness-raising groups uncovered the replication within many 
women’s most private relations, where they were thought to be most free, “a 
structure of dominance and submission which characterizes the entire public order” 
(1989, 94). That structure is experienced by each woman thus affected in her “own 
particular, even chosen, way” (94), which is not to say that all women experience 
that phenomenon. MacKinnon furthermore elaborates that this condition is often 
marked by ambivalence. She states: 
 
Realizing that women largely recognize themselves in sex-stereotyped terms, 
really do feel the needs they have been encouraged to feel, do feel fulfilled 
in the expected ways, often actually choose what has been prescribed, 
makes possible the realization that women at the same time do not 
recognize themselves in, do not feel, and have not chosen this place. (102) 
 
                                                        
6 See especially Campbell 2012, 142, 163, 173; Nenadic 2014, 102–103. 
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Her analysis accordingly has ample room for both feminist insight into 
women’s condition and recognition that “women’s nonfeminist perception of their 
situation is . . . probably as justified by aspects of the woman’s experience as a 
feminist perception would be” (102). Yet this openness is not such that it undercuts 
our ability to make some manner of truth claims about women’s condition, as 
relativism does (118). For, as MacKinnon indicates, (phenomenological) analysis of 
what consciousness raising reveals leads to a recognition that for something to be 
true about women’s condition, it need not be universal in the sense of holding for 
every single woman or being universal in an absolute way. It also reveals that 
consciousness of oppression is not inevitable (102).  
I think that we may interpret her conclusion as being in line with 
philosophical criticisms respectively of a Cartesian model of epistemology and a neo-
Hegelian teleological metaphysics. Such criticism is the centerpiece of Heidegger’s 
own major phenomenological project, especially his magnum opus Being and Time. 
Generally speaking, Cartesian epistemology assumes that our knowledge of the 
world can be absolutely certain. That knowledge is said to exhaust the reality of the 
domains that it is about and therefore to be definitive. Hegel extends such 
assumptions to the realms of human relations and history. He concludes that human 
history is governed by the law of freedom’s inevitable progress and of our inevitable 
consciousness of oppression and struggle for freedom as part of that larger law of 
history. He considers this law to be absolutely certain and to exhaust the reality of 
the domains of human relations and history.7 Marx carries over these basic 
assumptions from Hegel. In light of MacKinnon’s phenomenological treatment of 
women’s subordination and her subsequent encounter with Marxism, she is 
compelled fundamentally to question these assumptions, as I detail below.  
Her questioning has significant overlap with Heidegger’s famous criticism of 
this Cartesian and neo-Cartesian epistemology. He recognizes that the world, 
especially the humanistic domain, does not lend itself to being known in an 
absolutely certain, exhaustive, and definitive way, however much we may know 
about the world. There is simply too much variability and flux in life to fix it in this 
absolute manner. There will always be previously unconsidered experiences that 
may lead to new understanding of the areas in question. Accordingly, one can have 
knowledge of these areas without that knowledge having to hold in every single 
case or be understood in a manner that is absolute and exhaustive. That is, we may 
distinguish sounder understanding from less sound understanding while still 
maintaining an openness to the world, namely to other unconsidered experiences. 
That openness allows us to continue testing, tweaking, or, if need be, completely 
altering an established understanding in light of newly uncovered experiences or 
                                                        
7 See Hegel 1975, 1977. 
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changed contexts. MacKinnon’s treatment of epistemological issues reflects this 
position. That treatment also places her analysis within the orbit of contemporary 
continental criticisms of (postmodern) relativism.8  
On MacKinnon’s interpretation, feminism locates women’s consciousness of 
inequality within our resistance to the power of male dominance to so profoundly 
circumscribe our lives. Consciousness, she states, arises from circumstances of 
“being shaped in the image of one’s oppression, yet struggling against it,” a 
resistance to “the world in [women’s] . . . selves as well as toward a future” (1989, 
102). The central point of her interpretation of consciousness raising as feminism’s 
method is precisely to capture and appreciate women’s power and agency against 
that to which these political circumstances would limit women. But she does so 
without minimizing the destructiveness of those circumstances.  
Through consciousness raising, oppression that wasn’t previously as evident, 
even as its harms were undoubtedly felt, became more visible. That oppression was 
concealed especially through the fact that women tend to experience it separately 
and in isolation, in contrast with how oppressed groups that are together 
experience their subordination; their “togetherness” makes perception of 
oppression more discernable and less easily undermined (MacKinnon1989, 8). These 
developments revealed that “simply being a woman has a meaning that decisively 
defines all women socially” even as a woman’s particularities, for instance, “race or 
class or physiology may define her among women” (90).  
One must remember that these developments were occurring at a time 
when it was controversial to even suggest that there is something distinctive about 
women’s social subordination that demands its own discrete analysis emanating 
from these experiences. Then, it wasn’t more widely recognized that women’s 
inequality constitutes a discrete kind of subordination such as inequalities that were 
more recognized, for instance, race, or class, or anti-Semitism. Indeed, a significant 
point and outcome of these feminist efforts, especially writings such as 
MacKinnon’s, was to secure recognition of the very existence of women’s social 
subordination as a discernable type against varieties of denial that it is. The aim was 
to place a kind of thread around this area, acknowledging that it has a most basic 
shape and intelligible demarcations or boundaries. As MacKinnon’s work 
consistently emphasizes, those boundaries, however, have a permeability to them 
rather than being fixed or sealed up in an absolute way.  
MacKinnon sought to contribute to this recognition of the distinct existence 
of women’s social subordination in a manner that was careful not to subsume or 
otherwise deny the discrete existence of other and intersecting forms of inequality 
such as those of race or class. That is, she did not want to do what theorists of other 
                                                        
8See Harries 2002; Simpson 2001; Scharff 1997; MacKinnon 2000. 
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inequalities had often done about women’s subordination. In her role in helping to 
secure an understanding of women’s inequality as its own kind, within a 
contemporary context largely denying that recognition, she was especially attentive 
to preserve an ongoing openness to the complex context of how a woman or a 
group of women experience their condition. This attention is evident, among other 
ways, in her frequent expression of the tremendous need for and the still largely 
incipient state of theoretically mapping these intersecting inequalities. As she 
writes:  
 
To look for the place of gender in everything is not to reduce everything to 
gender. For example, it is not possible to discuss sex without taking account 
of Black women’s experiences of gender. To the considerable degree to 
which this experience is inseparable from the experience of racism, many 
features of sex cannot be discussed without racial particularity. . . . 
Comprehension and change in racial inequality are essential to 
comprehension and change in sex inequality. (1989, xi–xii) 
 
MacKinnon very meticulously, deftly, and consistently weaves concrete work 
on such intersectionality within her analyses. And, of course, that intersectionality is 
also at the heart of her legal precedents on behalf of women who live these 
interconnected forms of subordination.9 Nevertheless, she respects that TFTS 
 
does not pretend to present an even incipiently adequate analysis of race 
and sex, far less of race, sex, and class. That further work—building on 
writings by authors of color such as those cited in this volume, stunning 
efforts in fiction and literary criticism, developments in the social world and 
advances in political practice and analysis, and recent contributions in the 
legal arena by women such as Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mari Matsuda, Cathy 
Scarborough, and Patricia Williams—will take [still more time]. (1989, xi–xii) 
 
Through carefully gathering, distilling, and remaining grounded in the 
findings of a wide range of women’s experiences, MacKinnon embarked on 
formulating a theory that expressed what these findings suggested were the most 
salient features of the commonality of women’s subordination, a commonality that 
                                                        
9 For instance, on behalf of Mechelle Vinson, an African-American woman, in 
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). This case pioneered the claim for 
“hostile environment” sexual harassment as sex discrimination and was ratified by 
the Supreme Court. See also other examples such as the testimony and analysis in In 
Harm’s Way (MacKinnon and Dworkin 1997) and in the texts referenced in note 13.  
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she did not consider absolutely universal. A significant part of this procedure of 
theory formation was, as mentioned above, a constructively critical encounter with 
philosophy’s past, a move of course placing her project further in line with 
Heidegger’s philosophy, especially his idea of philosophy’s vocation. That is, in this 
grounded way, she “had it out” with the dominant theory of oppression, namely 
contemporary and historical Marxism, including here the thought of Engels and 
others.  
Traditional Marxist thought claimed already to account for women’s 
inequality. It thus obviated recognition of women’s inequality as a distinct 
experiential domain demanding its own phenomenologically elicited theoretical 
responses. MacKinnon describes how, thus grounded, she set out to assess such 
Marxist claims and the evidence adduced for them.  
 
I began trying to disentangle the economic from the sexual roots of women’s 
inequality: Is it sexism or capitalism [that principally explains the inequality of 
women as a group, even if not necessarily every woman]? . . . In this form, 
the question was intractable because it referred to realities that appeared 
fused in the world and the inquiry devolved into a question about the factor 
to be isolated: Is it sex or class?” (1989, x, italics added) 
 
Out of a very productive encounter with Marxist thought, MacKinnon arrived at a 
clearer appreciation that, contrary to traditional Marxist assumptions, women’s 
inequality demanded a “theory that could stand on its own” (x). She contrasts this 
appreciation with the totalizing claims of much Marxist thought that worked against 
such recognition.  
 
The aspiration to encompass all inequality within a critique of the ‘totality’ of 
social life has been a central feature of marxist theory from the beginning. Its 
ambition for inclusiveness has produced attempts to explain in marxist terms 
all inequalities marxists have perceived as real. Feminism by contrast has not 
typically regarded the existence of class, or any other social division or 
theory, as needing to be either subsumed or dismissed, or as a challenge to 
the theoretical viability or practical primacy of focus upon relations between 
the sexes. (1989, 60) 
 
MacKinnon did not find an already existing theory of male dominance that 
she thought offered an account of it in the way that Marxism did of class. That is, 
there was no theory “of [the] key concrete sites and laws of motion [of male 
dominance] . . . of why and how it happened and why (perhaps even how) it could 
11
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be ended” (x). Thus assessing that “feminism seemed an epic indictment in search of 
a theory, an epic theory in need of writing” (xi), she set out to construct one. 
MacKinnon’s phenomenological path toward that theory consisted, of 
course, in gathering the indications revealed by consciousness raising and related 
sources. It also consisted in canvassing and gathering clues left by historical feminist 
works by thinkers such as Mary Wollstonecraft, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, and 
Simone de Beauvoir. The new knowledge revealed by consciousness raising—much 
of it uncovering the nature of the damage and the pervasiveness of sexually 
intrusive treatment of women—was not as available to these past thinkers. So, their 
theories could not emanate phenomenologically from that ground of experience but 
instead left this dimension of the human condition still largely hidden. Nevertheless, 
they provided MacKinnon’s project with rich and helpful descriptions of “the 
variables and locales of sexism and possible explanations for it.” Andrea Dworkin’s 
thought, which does theorize from this ground, provided even more help (1989, xi).  
Thus anchored, prepared, and oriented, MacKinnon could carry out what I 
claim may be described in Heideggerian terms as a “de-structuring” or “destruction” 
of Marxist thought, or what, in Heidegger’s earlier work, he refers to as a 
“destructive retrieval” (Heidegger 2008, 41–49).10 These are his specific terms for 
that part of his idea of philosophy’s vocation centered on how the thinker, in 
constructing her own original theoretical account of a present-day problem, 
conducts a productive and critical engagement with philosophy’s past as a key step 
in that theory formation. “De-structuring” or “destructive retrieval” is, of course, 
phenomenological because the impetus behind the theory formation is that 
incipient understanding emanating from the experiential domain that is newly being 
considered. That fledgling understanding then guides the thinker in her encounter 
with philosophy’s past.  
To use Heidegger’s famous idea, this emerging new understanding helps 
“light up” (2008, 105) problematic assumptions of philosophy’s past that persist into 
the present-day and are implicated in actively concealing the dimension of the 
human condition at issue. That emerging understanding likewise “lights up” aspects 
of philosophy’s past that the thinker may creatively use to help construct that 
contemporary theory. “De-structuring” in this larger sense refers to a particular and 
rarer expression that phenomenological inquiry may take, an expression that 
delivers us closer to original thought. As such, we may consider it an additional 
element of the connections between MacKinnon’s project and Heidegger’s 
philosophy.  
                                                        
10 On “destructive retrieval,” especially Heidegger’s own “destructive retrievals” vis-
à-vis Dilthey and Nietzsche, see Scharff 2014, 164, 226–296.  
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MacKinnon thus conducts “de-structuring” vis-à-vis Marxism. Specifically, in 
light of the newly revealed domain of the systematic sexually intrusive treatment of 
women of which Marxism had no account and that it helped to conceal, MacKinnon 
wrested out from under Marxist thought both a clearer recognition that these 
experiences demanded their own account and an articulation of such a theory. She 
refers to this account as “feminism unmodified.” This is feminism that is qualified 
neither by Marxism nor by liberalism (another contemporary and historical tradition 
that she engages in TFTS).  
That is, hers is a theory of women’s subordination that is not subsumed by 
and disappeared into these other theories. To be “allowed to exist,” an account of 
women’s subordination need not remain entirely under their rubric any more than 
do analyses of racism, anti-Semitism, class, and other inequalities. But “feminism 
unmodified” does not leave class, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or other key 
dimensions of a woman’s experience behind. MacKinnon consistently and 
painstakingly insists on the contextual nature of women’s subordination. She 
recognizes that it cannot be extricated from its intersections with other kinds of 
subordination as well as with social privilege and other involvements in the world.  
One can have a discrete category of understanding, a category that preserves 
its own integrity, while at the same time remaining contextualized in the world, as 
part of involvements from which we are never fully extricated. This insistence on 
distinction within inextricable contextualization furthermore aligns MacKinnon with 
Heidegger’s project. For this position reflects an elemental feature of his philosophy, 
especially his criticism of Cartesian and neo-Cartesian ontology in Being and Time. 
Nor does “feminism unmodified” necessarily prioritize subordination based on sex in 
relation to other intersecting inequalities if circumstances do not 
phenomenologically warrant that understanding. The context and factual evidence 
of a given set of circumstances are what will determine whether there is such 
priority and what the priority may be. 
As a good portion of TFTS so precisely, methodically, and painstakingly 
shows, Marxist thought (and liberalism) have not explained women’s subordination 
but have typically assumed and concealed it in one way or another. This recognition 
is not to say that these traditions might not offer helpful resources for 
understanding women’s subordination, as they did, for instance, in the formulation 
of MacKinnon’s own theory. But such approaches have especially left issues of 
sexual objectification and violence unchanged (1989, 11).  
To express this shortcoming in Heideggerian language, these issues 
pertaining to sexual violation that distinctively and often cross-culturally affect 
women require a more “historical” approach. This means that the theorist needs to 
plumb more deeply into life as it is concretely experienced, at least this domain of 
life. She needs to re-immerse inquiry in the world rather than remain on the surface 
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of these phenomena, where one tends to reconstitute old assumptions in the 
absence of generative contact with this newly revealed ground under them. 
MacKinnon provides numerous concrete examples of this difficulty of fit between 
Marxism’s explanations of women’s inequality and many women’s experiences, 
especially those centering on sexual abuse and violence. For instance, given that 
many women’s class status is defined through their relations to men, how do we 
even determine the class status, much less the oppression at issue, when we are 
speaking about “the middle-class girl abducted into pornography” or “a young 
runaway fleeing rich suburban incest [and now] being pimped downtown?” (1989, 
48). 
TFTS reflects MacKinnon’s efforts to crystallize a theory that “fundamentally 
identifies sexuality as the primary sphere of male power” (109). Here, sexuality 
refers to that range of sexual objectification characterized by breaches of bodily and 
personal boundaries, directed mainly at women, which constitutes a lot of what 
sexual experience has been made into under men’s political dominance and is 
subsequently read off as natural sex difference. Feminism, especially her theory, 
questions sexuality as such in order to confront its limitations on our freedom and 
life possibilities. As MacKinnon often emphasizes about her claim here—against 
careless readings of her work—it reflects a general yet clearly discernable pattern 
without being absolute or all-encompassing. As already indicated, she explicitly 
rejects that her theory can be all-explanatory or absolutely universal or an absolute 
science, much less essentialist.11 I interpret her, in part, to be making this 
epistemological point when she says that feminism, or at least her working of it, is 
methodologically post-Marxist (107).  
In this vein, “men” or “male,” she writes, “is a social and political concept, 
not a biological attribute, having nothing whatever to do with inherency, 
preexistence, nature, essence, inevitability, or body as such” (MacKinnon 1989, 
114). It refers rather to “a gender group characterized by maleness as socially 
constructed” (112). She adds that “the perspective from [this] standpoint is not 
always each man’s opinions or even some aggregation or sum of men’s opinions, 
although most men adhere to it nonconsciously and without considering it a point of 
view” (114). Furthermore, any person, male or female, can inhabit this stance in any 
of its variety of forms, including the most extreme. For instance, one of the 
examples that MacKinnon adduces about the sexual use and breakdown of another 
                                                        
11 See Cindy Richards, “Fighting a Lie that Just Won’t Die,” Chicago Tribune, May 30, 
1999, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1999-05-30/news/9906030177_1_sexual-
harassment-databases-journalism-ethics; and also “Editor’s Note,” New York Times, 
February 12, 2006, Sunday Book Review, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/12/books/review/editors-note.html. 
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human being is that of one woman doing it to another woman (142). This example, 
however, remains firmly contextualized within the wider and unambiguous 
recognition that in present political circumstances, this kind of dynamic flows 
overwhelmingly in the direction of men towards women (and children). 
MacKinnon summarizes this phenomenological path of constructing her 
theory of sexuality, so understood, as the primary sphere of men’s political power 
over women. It emerged “from consciousness raising and other feminist practice on 
diverse issues including rape, incest, battery, sexual harassment, abortion, 
prostitution, and pornography” and not “from Freudian conceptions, not from 
Lacanian roots” (1989, 109). These psychoanalytic theories, Foucault’s work, and 
many later theories in this vein—when it became “customary to affirm that sexuality 
is socially constructed”—have had little relation to that ground of experience that 
consciousness raising and later studies uncovered (131). Instead, they have usually 
left unquestioned this general composition of sexuality that MacKinnon’s deeper 
phenomenological approach on the subject was “dismantling,” that is, sexuality that 
reflects breaches of the bodily and personal boundaries mainly of women. 
 
Further Continental Engagement with MacKinnon’s Thought 
When we bring MacKinnon’s major theoretical accomplishments in 
engagement with the continental tradition, hidden dimensions of the latter “light 
up.” Indeed, my own grounding in her work prior to my entry into professional 
philosophy oriented me towards Heidegger’s philosophy, towards recognizing 
connections between the two and the relevance of his thought for feminism. It 
helped me discern resources within his philosophy to creatively adapt to the task of 
taking our thinking about the problems of pornography and other sexual abuse and 
violence to new places. Those resources center on Heidegger’s criticisms of 
ambivalent aspects of modernity, modern freedom, and technology. Now, coming 
back to MacKinnon’s thought with a grounding in the philosophy of Heidegger and 
other major continental figures, in turn, “lights up” even further ways of engaging 
the two. Sparks fly as new possible directions and tasks for continental feminist 
inquiry come into view. Thus moving between MacKinnon’s thought and continental 
classics, they redound on each other.  
I have addressed only some of the most basic connections between 
MacKinnon’s thought and Heidegger’s philosophy. There are numerous other 
connections to flesh out here. One such task might be to elaborate ties between 
MacKinnon’s presentation of consciousness raising as feminism’s method and 
Heidegger’s phenomenology. That project would anchor consciousness raising in its 
philosophical tradition while taking that tradition to places where it could be even 
more directly relevant to real-world concerns. The result could serve as a platform 
for continuing to further map how phenomenology uncovers usually hidden 
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dimensions of the human condition in light of even more recent revelations of the 
role of sexual violation in women’s subordination, for instance, in such international 
contexts as crimes against humanity and genocide.  
Given MacKinnon’s “de-structuring” of Marxist thought, there are ample 
opportunities for productive engagement in relation to Marxist philosophy. One 
scholarly task would be to detail and explicate the complex path of that “de-
structuring.” That exercise would help render her philosophical project more widely 
intelligible, thus countering the still predominant simplifications and 
mischaracterizations of her work. It would also be instructive for showing, via 
MacKinnon’s particular path, a general model for doing theoretical and philosophical 
analysis that is so directly tied to real problems and ways of changing them. 
Furthermore, it would show how one arrives at that original thought, in this case 
concerning contemporary feminist topics, in ways that are consistent with, and thus 
benefit from, how major philosophers have arrived at it over the ages, which is 
through a “dialogue” with philosophy’s past. Of course, such an approach is not the 
only way of being philosophically relevant to feminist and other contemporary 
challenges.  
With regard to psychoanalytic theories or Foucault’s analysis of socially 
constructed sexuality, it would be instructive to engage them in light of MacKinnon’s 
theory of the place of sexuality, as manufactured under male dominance, in 
women’s social inequality. That is, it would be intriguing to see a “de-structuring” of 
these theories in light of the new experiential ground concerning the workings, 
imposition, and pervasiveness of sexually intrusive treatment of women. This hasn’t 
yet been done more comprehensively, including by feminist versions of 
psychoanalysis, as TFTS argues (57–59, 151–153), and by feminist deconstructions of 
psychoanalysis that do take these experiences into account but are less theoretical. 
There would also be an interesting project of thus engaging Irigaray’s work. 
MacKinnon herself indicates such a task. She appreciates Irigaray’s thought but, at 
the same time, recognizes that it is not connected to this particular ground. The 
knowledge emanating from that ground was not so readily available to Irigaray, as 
the work of more systematically drawing these experiences “out of concealment” 
was happening mainly in North America. In France, such experiences have only very 
recently been more widely investigated, uncovered, and treated as real against an 
especially effective denial of their reality. As MacKinnon analyzes: “Irigaray’s critique 
of Freud in Speculum of the Other Woman . . . acutely shows how Freud constructs 
sexuality from the male point of view, with woman as deviation from the norm. But 
she, too, sees female sexuality not as constructed by male dominance but only 
repressed by it” (1989, 280). It would be intriguing to see what productive outcomes 
arise were Irigaray’s thought, including her later work, considered in light of what I 
claim is MacKinnon’s phenomenological “de-structuring” of the notion of sexual 
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difference as one of dominance and her resulting complex understanding of sex 
equality that does not collapse it into sameness. The latter is something that her 
real-world legal work simply does not permit. 
MacKinnon also indicates possible directions for productive engagement 
with Beauvoir’s philosophy. In TFTS, she weaves in references to Beauvoir’s 
analyses. Respecting her insights, MacKinnon also offers phenomenological critique 
of ways that Beauvoir treats certain social conditions as universal givens that are 
beyond history. An example is Beauvoir’s identification of “woman’s biology as the 
source of [women’s] subordination.” MacKinnon explains: “[On Beauvoir’s analysis,] 
it is not the meaning [that] society has given women’s bodily functions but the 
functions themselves, existentially, that oppress women. . . . A woman’s body 
determines her social being as a pre-social matter” (54). It would be interesting to 
gather these references in TFTS into a more concerted engagement between their 
respective projects. Another thread of inquiry might be to investigate Beauvoir’s 
treatment of the Marquis de Sade in light of MacKinnon (and Dworkin’s) treatment 
of pornography.  
Many other fruitful projects come into view that are too numerous to 
mention here. The point is that they would be facilitated, and both feminism and 
philosophy would tremendously benefit, were MacKinnon’s thought more present 
and integrated in teaching and research in continental philosophy, that tradition 
which her work natively inhabits. For example, it should be taught with Heidegger, 
Marx, Beauvoir, Hegel, Irigaray, Foucault, and psychoanalysis, among other areas, 
not to mention taught expressly as a part of continental feminism.  
All indications suggest that the main problems that MacKinnon seeks to 
better understand and change, namely the oppression associated with the physical 
and internal breakdown effected by sexual objectification and abuse, in all their 
complexity and despite gains made, have not gone away. Indeed, they are becoming 
worse, especially through pornography’s unprecedented reach and mainstreaming 
in the Internet age. It is also a fact that the history of philosophy and academic 
philosophy today still don’t have a thinker whose work more systematically 
addresses these problems in the way that MacKinnon’s work does. We won’t find 
these analyses in Beauvoir, Kristeva, Irigaray, Butler, or psychoanalysis, despite how 
helpful some of their works might be. Instead, those of us in academic philosophy 
who are working on these problems are drawing significant theoretical sources from 
MacKinnon’s thought. That is where we mainly go if we want to address such 
problems that are so much of our contemporary landscape that they hardly stand 
out as such. 
In this vein, I want to conclude by briefly revisiting the issue of what a 
grounding in MacKinnon’s work can help reveal to thought and to efforts at seeking 
practical solutions to contemporary crises. On a trip to Europe in the early 1990s, I 
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took a copy of TFTS to Asja Armanda, a Croatian-Jewish feminist. This was just 
before the genocidal war in the region when Serbia attacked Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and Kosovo and committed atrocities not seen in Europe since the 
Holocaust. Armanda responded practically and philosophically to this crisis and, with 
her, I soon followed suit. In our work with refugee survivors in the war zone, we 
phenomenologically elicited and theorized a usually hidden dimension of the human 
condition that we named “genocidal sexual atrocities” or “genocidal rape.” This 
crime was not “known” to the world before this genocide and precisely for that 
reason needed philosophy to make it known. Key sources of theoretical guidance in 
our work with concentration camp survivors include Armanda’s own remarkable 
feminist philosophical background on issues of sexual abuse and her knowledge of 
the Holocaust. Against all odds, she cultivated that understanding through 
desperately seeking clues outside the closed, Marxist-totalitarian country of 
Yugoslavia in which she grew up and outside the regime’s official philosophers and 
its official positions on and by women. These sources also include ones that I 
brought, especially MacKinnon’s thought on sexual abuse, civil rights, and law as 
well as African-American feminist thought on the intersections between sex and 
ethnicity.12 This is the philosophy that we went to, philosophy that gave us real aid 
in our own, urgently needed, original thinking and that could help us make a real 
difference in the world.  
However, this fledgling understanding about genocidal rape would have 
been snuffed out by an unimaginable and relentless campaign of genocide denial 
and lost to history had MacKinnon not, at my request, agreed to intervene in these 
events. Specifically, I asked her to represent survivors in a legal action that Armanda 
and I were pursuing. The three of us soon initiated a landmark lawsuit in New York 
(Kadic v. Karadzic) that would pioneer the crime’s recognition under international 
law. Through the public voice that MacKinnon gave to making this crime more 
widely intelligible, we could eventually break through that denial such that this 
crime is now recognized in the world.13  
For philosophy to be seriously relevant to such major problems of our time, 
we need greater availability and deeper consideration of MacKinnon’s thought, 
especially within continental philosophy. For that is the tradition from which her 
thought arose: Her work is guided by the phenomenological task of gathering, 
distilling, and theorizing the insights of a range of feminist practices and writings and 
is more clearly formulated through productive and critical encounter with 
philosophy’s past. This original thought, in turn, guided the major legal, policy, and 
                                                        
12 Just prior to this period, I had been a student of Angela Y. Davis and had the 
opportunity even more rigorously to study this area of thought. 
13 See Nenadic 2011; MacKinnon 2007a. 
18




other positive practical changes in the world that MacKinnon has delivered and 
continues to deliver. These changes are themselves monumental achievements of so 
many women’s agency, changes that now offer new and previously unimagined 
possibilities of that agency. All of these developments were the outcome of both 
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